Below are some policy writings that are not or no longer confidential.
with Ben Johannsen
A series of questions and answers explaining key aspects of the Fed's 2025 Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communications, covering motivation and structure of the review as well as its key conclusions. The Q&As were released simultaneously with the Chair's announcement of the conclusion of the review during his 2025 Jackson Hole speech.
Part of the "Tealbook" briefing book prepared for the FOMC ahead of each regularly scheduled meeting, the Monetary Policy Strategies section discusses the likely effects of different monetary policy strategies using model-based simulations. The Tealbook is released to the public after five years. I have authored this section for the following meetings:
with James Hebden, Edward Herbst, Jenny Tang, and Giorgio Topa
We analyze the robustness of makeup strategies—policies that aim to offset, at least in part, past misses of inflation from its objective—to alternative modeling assumptions, with an emphasis on the role of inflation expectations. We survey empirical evidence on the behavior of shorter-run and long-run inflation expectations. Using simulations from the FRB/US macroeconomic model, we find that makeup strategies can moderately offset the real effects of adverse economic shocks, even when much of the public is uninformed about the monetary strategy. We also discuss the robustness of makeup strategies to alternative assumptions about the slope of the Phillips curve and the (mis)perception of economic slack.
Presented to the FOMC in 2019 as background for its discussion of the Federal Reserve's review of monetary policy strategy, tools and communication practices.
with Martin Bodenstein and Ben Johannsen
Part of a series on monetary policy principles and practice on the Board's public website, this note explains three key principles of good monetary policy. First, monetary policy should be well understood and systematic. Second, the central bank should provide monetary policy stimulus when economic activity is below the level associated with full resource utilization and inflation is below its stated goal. Conversely, the central bank should implement restrictive monetary policy when the economy is overheated and inflation is above its stated goal. Third, the central bank should raise the policy interest rate, over time, by more than one-for-one in response to a persistent increase in inflation and lower the policy rate more than one-for-one in response to a persistent decrease in inflation. The Taylor rule is discussed as an example for these principles.
with Sarah Baker and Etienne Gagnon
A series of timelines available on the Board's public website compile the of the Federal Reserve's key monetary policy actions and communications from the eve of the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession until the start of the 2019-2020 framework review.